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Abstract 
 
The view that takes laws of nature to be essentially nothing more than descriptions of 
facts is still rather popular. The present paper, on the contrary, defends the claim that 
the only real motivation for defending a descriptive view of laws – the quest for 
ontological parsimony – entails too high a price to pay in philosophical terms. It is 
argued that nomic primitivism, namely the alternative option that takes laws to be 
primitive fundamental entities in our ontology, is decisively more appealing, since it is 
the crucial role assigned to laws what makes a scientific theory of natural phenomena a 
system rather than a list. Finally, the implications that nomic primitivism might have on 
the issue of the status of the wave function in that particular formulation of quantum 
mechanics known as Bohmian mechanics are considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
1  Introduction 
About ten years ago I spoke with Einstein about the 
astonishing fact that so many ministers of various 
denominations are strongly interested in the theory of 
relativity. Einstein said that according to his estimation 
there are more clergymen interested in relativity than 
physicists. A little puzzled I asked him how he would 
explain this strange fact. He answered, a little smiling, 
"Because clergymen are interested in the general laws of nature 
and physicists, very often, are not. " 
 
Frank 1949, p. 349 
 
According to a common sense intuition, the very idea of natural law entails that 
the law governs the phenomena falling under its domain of application. According 
to this intuition, the true role of a natural law is exactly that of providing for the 
relevant phenomena such ‘governing’ things as order, structure, evolution over 
time, and the like. Bas van Fraassen, just to mention one out of many possible 
examples, echoes such a widely felt intuition when in his Laws and Symmetry he 
recalls that one of the main tasks traditionally attributed to natural science is 
exactly “to state the laws which the things in the universe obey” (van Fraassen 
1989, p. 18, emphasis added)1. Although it does not prove anything per se and 
needs to be supplemented by robust arguments in order to be convincing, this 
intuition seems to have an undeniable appeal and van Fraassen’s wording is 
especially apt in our case: when there is someone or something that governs, there 
is always also someone or something that obeys and, in the case of natural 
phenomena, for them to obey means that they are constrained by some form of 
necessity or ‘nomicity’ (be it deterministic or indeterministic): we tend to think 
that a freely falling stone cannot choose whether its motion will be uniform or 
accelerated!  
As we know from the history of philosophy, however, it is highly 
controversial whether we can legitimately project such necessity or nomicity 
onto the world or we should limit ourselves to locate them within the knowing 
subject. For instance according to a reductionist approach, we should resist the 
governing view of laws, since it does not seem inevitable to assume such a modal 
                                                          
1 As is well known, however, van Fraassen himself strongly opposes the view that one of the 
main tasks, if not the main, of natural sciences is the search after laws. 
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feature for the notion of law. In such an framework, it is not a conceptual truth 
that laws govern, so that it is perfectly possible to entertain a non-governing 
view of laws without being plainly inconsistent: in this framework “laws are 
purely descriptive of the particular matters of fact” (Beebee 2000, in Carroll 
2004, 256). 
For a philosophical position, however, to be logically consistent is not 
equivalent to be convincing. In the present paper I will argue against this 
particular descriptive emphasis of the non-governing view of laws, by showing 
further motivations – in addition to the most familiar ones – why such view of 
laws turns out to be especially defective. Although it is not plainly inconsistent 
to deny that the modal character is intrinsic to the notion of law, I will argue 
that the purely descriptive view has such counterintuitive implications that it 
fails to countenance features that any decent notion of law cannot, after all, 
afford to miss. In fact, the only real motivation for defending a descriptive view 
of laws appears to be a quest for ontological parsimony – the whole reality 
conceived as nothing but an astronomical amount of unconnected local facts – a 
motivation that requires a significant price to pay in philosophical terms. On the 
basis of the claim that laws should be rather viewed as grounding natural 
processes in a non-purely descriptive fashion, I will then elaborate on one of the 
possible options that are alternative to the regularity view, namely the so-called 
primitivist approach to laws: a special attention will be then devoted, in the last 
section, to the implications that this form of nomic primitivism might have on 
the issue of the status of the wave function in that particular formulation of 
quantum mechanics known as Bohmian mechanics.  
 
 
2 The descriptive view of laws 
 
The debate on the nature of lawhood is a complex, intertwined network of 
issues. Starting from a very general dichotomy, according to which either laws 
are somehow a part of nature or they pertain only to scientific theories (hence – 
lastly – to us as knowing subjects), the controversy proceeds toward further, 
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more specific issues: regularity vs. necessity, the role of Humean supervenience, 
the relation with the use of laws in scientific practice, the governing vs. the non-
governing status of laws, and so on. Ned Hall claims, for instance: 
 
By far the most central and important question about laws of nature is this: are they 
mere patterns in the phenomena (patterns that are in some way salient, to be sure – but 
still, nothing more than patterns)? Or are they something more, something that 
somehow governs or constrains those phenomena? Disagreement over this issue 
constitutes the Schism in contemporary philosophical work on laws of nature. (Hall 
2012, p. 1)2 
 
This sort of disagreement is in non-linear relation with different, possible 
positions over the issue whether we should think that there really are items like 
‘laws’ and the search for such ‘things’ is the essence of science: anti-laws 
philosophers like Bas van Fraassen or Ron Giere have vehemently denied it: 
 
The claims of some philosophers, that scientists seek to discover laws of nature, cannot 
be taken as a simple description of scientific practice, but must be recognized as part of 
an interpretation of that practice. The situation is complicated, of course, by the fact 
that, since the seventeenth century, scientists have themselves used the expression «law 
of nature» in characterizing their own practice. (Giere 1999, p. 84) 
 
But if one accepts as a working hypothesis the existence of ‘law-like’ items in the 
inventory of the world, a major issue is of course what are the terms in which 
should we conceive the relation between such items and the particular 
phenomena that in some way or another ‘fall under’ them. It is at this stage that 
the controversy ‘governing vs. non-governing’ arises. The “Governing answer 
[…] insists that there are genuine laws of nature and furthermore that these 
laws govern or even produce the events of the world” whereas “the Non-
Governing answer […] has it that there are genuine laws of nature, but that 
they do not govern or produce the events of the world. The mosaic of events 
                                                          
2 Hall 2012 is an unpublished manuscript, which is a much more comprehensive version of Hall 
2015. 
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displays certain patterns, and it is in the features of some of these patterns that 
we find laws.” (Cohen, Callender 2009, p. 2). In a Humean, reductionist 
perspective, we should be careful in admitting suspect versions of necessity in 
nature so that, as a consequence, we should not require from laws any 
‘governing’ role as a constitutive feature. In the global metaphysical view of the 
world that is on the background of (any version of) views like this, any modal, 
governing feature in mentioning laws must be traced back to us as subjects, not 
to the world, that in itself is nothing but a collection of sparse entities, usually 
conceived as discrete. Hall captures the Lewisian terse way to characterize this 
view: “Drawing inspiration from Hume, [Lewis] took the fundamental 
ontological structure to consist in the pattern of instantiation by space-time 
points of perfectly natural monadic properties, together with the facts about the 
spatiotemporal relations among those points.” (Hall 2012, p. 5) 
In a regularist brand of a reductionist perspective, what is admitted is just the 
existence of a(n astronomical) number of matters of fact and the existence of a 
certain number of regularities connecting them (Mumford 2004, 32): although it 
is far from trivial specifying what a regularity exactly is in non-modal terms, a 
(naïve) regularity view denies the existence of necessary connections or laws 
whose role in some way or another would be to ground the regularities. The 
more sophisticated versions of a regularity view, summarized in the so-called 
Mill-Ramsey-Lewis best-system view, turn out to be an elaboration of how we as 
subjects should organize regularities, if we want them to play the role that non-
Humean views usually associate to the notion of law. The now classic 
formulation of David Lewis – according to which the ‘laws of nature’ are the 
universal statements that belong to all the true deductive systems with a best 
combination of simplicity and strength (Lewis 1973, 73) – makes explicit the 
disregard for what is often interpreted as the instrinsically modal character of 
natural laws. According to Peter Menzies, for instance, this is exactly the main 
defect of all regularity, best-system approaches to laws: 
 
The defect is that they fail to capture the modal character of laws of nature. […] It is in 
virtue of this modal feature of laws that they fail to conform to Humean supervenience: 
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two worlds agreeing on actual occurrent facts may differ in their modal structure. 
Lewis’s theory fails because all such regularity must fail; for they try to fashion modal 
facts from the thin actualistic resources of Humean empiricism. But to do this is to 
commit what might be called the actualist fallacy of trying to derive conclusions about 
the possible and the necessary from premises about the actual. No amount of 
sophisticated talk of ideal systems that combine simplicity and information content will 
make this fallacious inference virtuous. (Menzies 1993, pp. 200-201) 
 
In the wake of the position echoed by Menzies, there might be then a tempting 
move for the anti-regularist: by assuming the reliability of a strong modal 
intuition on laws, the anti-regularist might count a governing view of laws as an 
instance of this modal intuition and define laws as abstract governing entities, 
with the effect of dismissing the non-governing view of laws on simple 
conceptual grounds.  
Now, no matter what the position on the irreducibility of modal features of 
laws we hold, objections of the sort argued for by Menzies look like a petitio 
principii, since whether laws of nature should be conceived modally or not is 
exactly the point under discussion. Moreover, a regularist may well resist the 
claim that the notion of law is to be defined in governing terms: she will try to 
claim that such move is far from unavoidable and that, as a consequence, a non-
governing conception of laws is perfectly consistent. This is what Helen Beebee, 
for example, tries to accomplish by claiming that one can define law as 
governing only by assuming an analogy between laws in nature and laws in 
other domains such as theology, politics, ethics and so on: but if this assumption 
is rejected (and it can be rejected), the governing feature of laws fails to be a 
conceptual truth (Beebee 2000).  
According to Beebee the governing intuition about laws might be justified 
only if we assume a deep similarity between the way in which phenomena are 
constrained by natural laws on one side and the way in which moral individuals as 
believers, citizens and so on are subject to prescriptive laws on the other. This 
similarity fails, however, for at least two reasons. First, in the human, 
prescriptive domain it is possible for an individual to violate laws, something 
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which is not easily the case with natural laws: indeed, it seems constitutive of 
moral and political laws that they can be broken, since it is from this possibility 
that their prescriptive role derives its meaning. Second, moral and political laws 
contemplate forms of punishment for their violation, something which hardly 
makes sense if extended to natural laws. What does all this show? Well, it is 
very plausible to think that if common sense does take it to be part of the concept 
of law of nature that those laws govern, then it does so only because of a tacit 
assumption that laws of nature operate in a way that is analogous to the way that 
other laws – laws which really do govern – operate. But that assumption cannot 
be maintained, since the alleged governing nature of natural laws would have to 
be entirely unlike the prescriptive nature of moral and other laws. (Beebee 2000, 
in Carroll 2004, p. 260) 
Now even if, as a working hypothesis, we assume the plausibility of these 
arguments3 and concede that the analogy between natural laws and other sorts 
of law is not entirely plausible, or implausible at all, the question remains: what 
exactly does the regularist view implies about the very notion of law? First of all, 
let us focus on a linguistic stipulation. If by ‘law’ we agree to mean 
‘regularity+something-grounding-the-regularity’, it follows that in strictly naïve 
regularist terms there are no laws at all: according to the metaphysical view on 
the background of the regularist stance, the world is a lawless place. On the 
other hand, we may simply decide to equate ‘law’ and ‘regularity’, without 
charging the term ‘law’ with the responsibility of embodying some principles – 
the principles ‘in virtue of which’ the regularity would be supposed to hold4 - 
over and above the regularities themselves. The latter is the option adopted by 
Beebee 2000 who characterizes the divide between Humean and anti-Humean 
stances in these terms: 
 
For the anti-Humean, laws (unlike accidentally true generalizations) do something – 
they govern what goes on in the universe – and they therefore require some sort of 
                                                          
3 The issue of possible violations of laws of nature, for instance, is not an idle one. 
 
4 In our opinion the first strategy is definitely less confusing but, provided uniformity is 
guaranteed, no serious conceptual harm is caused by the second strategy. 
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ontological basis […] that gives them this ability. Humeans, on the other hand, do not 
require laws to “do” anything: like accidentally true generalizations, laws are at bottom 
merely true descriptions of what goes on. Thus for the Humean there is no need for any 
ontological distinction between laws and accidents. (Beebee 2000, in Carroll 2004, pp. 
258-259) 
 
Under this linguistic stipulation concerning laws, then, let us focus on what in a 
Humean framework a purely descriptive view of laws might entail. Humeans 
deny the need for a search after something that might ‘ground’ a regularity: they 
“do not require laws to «do» anything: like accidentally true generalizations, 
laws are at bottom merely true descriptions of what goes on”. The descriptive 
view seems therefore to support the idea that a law is literally nothing but a sum 
of facts: “for the Humean, since the laws are descriptive, what the laws are 
depends on what the facts are” (ibidem). What I would like to argue for in what 
follows is that such view, although it cannot be ruled out in terms of logical 
consistency, entails features that are seriously contrived in order for the 
descriptive view of laws to be plausible. I will take into account four points: (1) 
determinism, (2) the implications of a possible set-theoretic reading of a law-as-
sum, (3) the problem of the cardinality of the set of facts, (4) the problem of 
uniformity.  
(1) The case of determinism  
Let us consider then first the case of deterministic evolution over time. 
According to Beebee, determinism is useful to express coincisely the non-
governing relation that by a Humean standpoint is supposed to hold between the 
law and the facts that intuitively are accounted for by the law:  
 
We can characterize determinism in the following rough and ready way: the state of the 
universe at any given time together with the laws of nature determines what the state of 
the universe will be at any future time. But what does “determines” mean here? For the 
Humean, the laws and current facts determine the future facts in a purely logical way: 
you can deduce facts from current facts plus the laws. And this is just because laws are, in 
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part, facts about the future” (Beebee 2000, in Carroll 2004, p. 257, emphasis in the 
original text).  
 
Two minor points, to begin with, that are far from clear. What would the notion 
of fact about the future exactly mean by a strictly Humean, descriptivist 
viewpoint? It seems that, in the metaphysics this viewpoint presupposes, there is 
simply – at every given instant of time – a given collection of facts, none of 
which can be ‘about’ something that does not exist yet. A fact is what it is just 
because there is nothing beyond it and this is just the role that it is supposed to 
play in this lawless image of the world: to be nothing but what it is, full stop. 
Moreover, no matter whether the notion of fact about the future is consistent with 
a Humean metaphysics, I do not see how a Humean can be legitimated to say 
that laws are facts but only ‘in part’: What is the remaining part? Does it need to 
be ‘added’ to the purely factual part of laws? Was not the core of the Humean 
view of laws that these are literally nothing but facts? 
 But let me come to the main point. This Humean understanding of 
determinism overlooks that its ‘determining’ capability is grounded on a specific 
mathematical formulation of a dynamical law. Take the Newton 2nd law. The 
general form of this dynamical law states a proportionality between force and 
acceleration: when a specific formulation for a kind of force is inserted into the 
2nd law, we obtain a mathematical equation that, under non-trivial conditions 
turns out to be integrable. This is what justifies us to assume that the knowledge 
of a given (initial) state and of what is the force (if any) acting on the system 
makes it possible to determine future states of the system (and also past states, if 
the evolution satisfies time reversal invariance). So the crucial point is that the 
determination is possible due to the functional relations among physical 
quantities, relations that are encoded into the mathematical formulation of 
Newton’s law: this encoding can hardly be reduced to any ‘sum’ of facts and 
cannot be easily accounted for in a purely descriptive view of laws. In addition to 
that, let us consider the relation between determinism and predictability. There 
are well-known physical situations (deterministic chaos, three-body problem, …) 
in which, apparently, the phenomena are governed by deterministic laws but we 
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are not able to predict what the future states will be, namely we are not able to 
‘produce facts’ – in the Humean-like jargon – on the basis of the dynamical law at 
hand. What is left of the Humean-kind-of-law if we simply cannot deduce the 
future facts on the basis of the pair <initial conditions, law> even if the 
phenomena are governed by a deterministic law? 
(2) Laws-as sums: a set-theoretical reading?  
The idea that laws are ‘sums’ of facts lends itself to receive a set-theoretic 
reading. So let us suppose that we have the following collections of states S at 
their respective times t 
Fn = {..........., S(tn-1), S(tn)},   
Fn+m = {..........., S(tn), ......, S(tn+m-1), S(tn+m)} 
If we assume that any of these states is a collection of values of a set of relevant 
physical quantities, each state may well represent a ‘fact’ in the regularist vein, 
since each state works as a sort of snapshot at its time t(*) of the physical situation 
at stake. Moreover, we assume that the states both in Fn and Fn+m are obtained as 
the computational output of the algorithm implicit in one and the same 
deterministic dynamical law.  
Now, the intuition tells us that we have here the same law accounting for the 
evolution of our system at two different times. But, since in a Humean reading 
there is nothing to a law except a ‘sum’ of facts, in the present case the Humean 
reading seems to have no resource to avoid the paradoxical consequence that 
here we deal with two sort-of-laws, since we have two different sums! Even 
worse: at any successive instant of time a new law-as-a-sum is generated. But, 
then, being parsimonious on any alleged modal features of the world seems 
paradoxically to imply a wild and uncontrollable generation of laws-as-sums 
over time, a phenomenon in strong tension with an aspiration to a metaphysical 
economy. On the other hand, should there be a unifying principle according to 
which Fn and Fn+m might be shown to be just two instances of one and the same 
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law, this principle could not simply supervene on the states and because of this 
non-supervenience this account would immediately become a non-Humean one.  
(3) The problem of cardinality 
An additional problem (but perhaps for another paper) for the regularist view 
might concern the cardinality of the set of all possible facts. Is that set finite or 
infinite? Since it seems hard to devise a robust argument to argue that facts are 
absolutely in finite number, let us turn to the infinity horn. In this case, our 
intuition is likely to suggest that the set of all possible facts should be conceived 
as a countable set, but to a large extent what is intuitive or not is a matter of 
convention: there seems to be no unique way of cutting reality into facts so as to 
ensure that there are exactly as facts as natural numbers, so who are we to deny 
that the set of all the facts might have the cardinality of the reals? In this case, 
however, we might have a hard time simply in discriminating one fact from 
another, so that even the most basic statement of a regularist view – there are 
just facts – seems to be under threat. 
(4) The problem of uniformity 
Sometimes the above Humean view of a lawless world in terms of ‘mosaic’ of 
individual, local matters of fact is formulated with the aid of what has been called 
recombination (Hall 2015) or redistribution (Hildebrand 2013) principle. Namely, 
given a mosaic of individual, local matters of fact, there is no privileged way of 
setting up the mosaic, since this alleged privileged way would amount to a sort 
of ‘ordering’ principle over and above the mosaic itself, a consequence that a die-
hard Humean could not admit: hence any possible combination or distribution of 
such matters of fact is equally possible. In this case, however, a ban on any 
constraints over the possible arrangements of individual, local matters of fact 
seems to have the undesirable consequence that it fails to explain why our world 
is in fact highly uniform, since the absence of constraints makes non-uniform 
arrangements as likely as the uniform ones. The recourse to the idea of pattern is 
of no help here: if we have sufficient reasons to ascribe one or more ‘patterns’ to a 
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given arrangement, those patterns embody de facto a kind of uniformity that the 
no-constraints ban is unable to account for. 
 
 
3 Primitivism about laws 
 
As we have seen, there are a number of reasons why one should be dissatisfied 
with the anti-necessitarian viewpoint. In particular, from that viewpoint it turns 
out to be difficult to cope with that seemingly irreducibly modal aspect that 
informs our explicit and implicit way of employing or referring to laws: for 
instance, the demand according to which laws must cover ‘possibilities’, and not 
just actualities, and the demand according to which, when we ask a law to explain 
facts, we search after what is in virtue of which facts obtain. Moreover, a look at 
the actual scientific practice when analyzing how laws work does nothing but 
increase the dissatisfaction: one of the most perplexing points of the above 
discussed features of a Humean stance on laws of nature is that of implying a 
truly structureless world, an implication that seems hard to reconcile with a 
scientific image of the natural world, even broadly construed. 
It is from this perspective that we will be concerned with an alternative to the 
descriptive view of laws, namely the so-called primitivist approach5. Basically, 
primitivism about laws can come in two varieties: in its metaphysical dimension, 
laws belong to the fundamental inventory of the world whereas in its conceptual 
dimension, laws are not to be reduced to more primitive notions:  
 
My analysis of laws is no analysis at all. Rather, I suggest we accept laws as 
fundamental entities in our ontology. Or, speaking at the conceptual level, the notion of 
a law cannot be reduced to other more primitive notions” (Maudlin 2007, p. 18).  
 
                                                          
5 Under the assumption according to which a descriptive view of laws is a reductionist view in a 
serious sense, the primitivist approach is an anti-reductionist view which includes similar, but 
mutually non-equivalent positions such as Carroll (1994, 2008), Lange (2000, 2009), and Maudlin 
(2007): in the present paper we will focus on the Maudlin version. 
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When a given notion Ni is chosen as primitive within a set {N1,…, Ni,…,Nn} of 
possible alternatives, the general question arises immediately of what would be 
the deeper motivation for ascribing to Ni rather than to Ni+1 or Ni-1 the status of 
‘primitive’, a question the Maudlin’s reply to which reads as follows: 
 
Taking laws as primitives may appear to be simple surrender in the face of a 
philosophical puzzle. But every account must have primitives. The account must be 
judged on the clarity of the inferences that the primitives warrant and on the degree of 
systematization they reveal among our pre-analytic inferences. (Maudlin 2007, p. 15)6 
 
On the background of the obvious remark, then, according to which there must 
be some entity or notion that is selected as primitive anyway, the choice of laws 
as primitive may have at least two significant strong points. First, the primitive 
status of laws allows one to have a more effective and stimulating confrontation 
with the role of laws within specific scientific theories: the above reference to actual 
scientific practice should be read in this sense. Second, the primitive status of 
laws promises to plausibly accommodate interrelated notions – causation, 
explanation, counterfactuals – that, together with lawhood, appear to form a true 
conceptual network. In fact, laws as primitives can be reasonably seen as able to 
translate causal relations into nomic ones, as grounding counterfactuals if 
similarity of possible worlds is formulated in terms of compatibility with given 
laws and, finally, they can preserve their role in explanation. Let us briefly focus 
on the two last points. 
The connection between laws and counterfactuals is obviously deep, due to 
the issue of whether modality is intrinsic to the very notion of law or not. As we 
recalled earlier, laws are intuitively supposed to account not only for the actual 
phenomena but also for possible ones, and are supposed to account for the 
uniformity of the natural world in terms of non-contingent, law-governed 
processes.  In the Maudlin version of primitivism, laws as primitives can handle 
                                                          
6 In his proposal, Maudlin selects a specific form of fundamental law as particularly apt to cover 
many law instances in the special sciences, namely what he calls FLOTE, i.e. Fundamental Law 
Of Temporal Evolution (Maudlin 2007, p. 12). This option raises immediately the question (that 
we will not touch here) of whether this choice compels one to assume also time – entering the 
FLOTE-kind of laws – as a primitive entity or not. 
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this modal core of the lawhood intuition through their capacity of generating 
(classes of) models. A given law gives rise to possible worlds to the extent that it 
sets boundaries to the occurrence of phenomena. All that according to precise 
prescriptions fixed by the law remains within the boundaries is ‘possible’: “the 
possible worlds consistent with a set of laws are described by the models of a 
theory that formulates those laws” (Maudlin 2007, p. 18). If setting the 
boundaries for the validity of a law is what allows for possibility in the 
primitivist framework, necessity is obtained at a very low cost: since it is the 
very compatibility with laws that generates a set of models, the laws themselves 
must hold in all models of the set and therefore display a nomic necessity (in the 
usual, possible-world language, Maudlin 2007, p. 21)7. As to the connection with 
explanation, the primitive status of laws allows us to select any account of 
explanation we like in which laws play a sufficiently crucial role, without 
worrying whether the plausibility of the model of explanation we selected is 
threatened or not by some more fundamental notion in terms of which the notion 
of law is reduced: we have explanation of an event f whenever we have a nomic 
subsumption of f under the relevant set of laws L, namely whenever we may 
show that, given L, the event f is what we should expect (Maudlin 2007, pp. 34 
ff). 
 Since no wide-ranging philosophical view concerning such a deep issue as the 
issue of laws on nature can go unchallenged, let us take into consideration some 
possible objections to the primitivist account. A first point concerns the status of 
laws in terms of their alleged ‘fundamentality’. At a given stage of development 
of a scientific theory, we may have reasons to think that a given law is  
fundamental, a circumstance that seems to go along well with the claim that laws 
are primitive endowments of the natural world’s ontology. History of science, 
however, has taught us that laws that were supposed to be fundamental turned 
out to be only special cases of more general laws and still history of science, 
                                                          
7 An additional advantage seems to be that, if we assume laws as primitives, the principle 
according to which we generate models only in terms of their compatibility with laws requires – 
so to say – a ‘minimum’ of modality: possibility is exactly law-compatibility, whereas necessity is 
obtained simply from the fact that the validity of the law is a sort of fixed point in any law-
generated model.   
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jointly with philosophy of science, suggests that there are no reasons to think 
that there is a foreseeable end to this process of ever-increasing generality. How 
are we to cope with this problem? It hardly looks reasonable to assume that the 
whole network of laws is primitive from the start: would not it be awkward to 
suppose that, for instance, Kepler’s laws are as primitive as Newton’s laws, and 
these in turn as primitive as the Einstein’s field equations of general relativity? 
Although clearly primitive and fundamental are not equivalent concepts, one 
might think that the conventionality inherent in selecting which laws are 
supposed to be fundamental and which derivative might be at least disturbing for 
primitivism. On the other hand, in different areas of science results have been 
obtained that prove in principle our inability to grasp some kind of knowledge – 
from the undecidability theorems to the black hole information loss theorems –  
so that the idea that we might be unable to access part or the totality of the really 
fundamental laws need not contradict the possibly primitive ontological status of 
some of these laws. 
 A second point has been raised concerning the alleged failure of the 
primitivist account in its explanatory power. According to Tyler Hildebrand, for 
instance, the primitivist approach fails in this respect exactly like Humeanism 
(Hildebrand 2013). As we recalled earlier Humeanism – in accepting any 
distribution of properties as possible (according to the recombination principle) – 
has no resources to explain the circumstance that there seems to be a certain 
uniformity among distributions and that not all distributions seem to be on a par 
in this respect. Hildebrand argues that primitivism about laws suffers from an 
essentially identical problem: according to Hildebrand, taking laws as primitives 
has the two following, significant implications: 
 
First, PGL [what Hildebrand calls the “Primitive Governing Laws” view] allows no 
explanation of why we have the laws we do as opposed to other possible laws. If laws are 
wholly primitive, on what basis can we explain why we have one rather that another? 
[…] Second, PGL places no restrictions on the content of laws, so laws could give rise 
to every logically consistent distribution of natural properties. (Hildebrand 2013, p. 5) 
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A preliminary, meta-philosophical kind of remark is that a principled theory 
concerning natural laws is supposed to address a de iure problem – namely, a 
problem like “what is a law of nature?” or “how does a Humean or a non-Humean 
view contribute to a deeper understanding of laws of nature?” – and not a de facto 
problem, like the contingent problem of why we have laws that set constraints 
for certain systems, quantities or processes and not for others. For this reason, 
the latter kind of problem is something for which primitivism need not provide 
an independent explanation. 
In a more substantial vein, Humeanism and primitivism are far from having 
the same problem. While Humeanism – due to the anti-necessitarian flavor of the 
adopted recombination principle – is forced not to have resources to privilege 
certain distributions over others, primitivism is not: in assuming laws as 
belonging to the metaphysical, fundamental inventory of the world, I hold that 
primitivism has the freedom to choose the particular way in which laws are 
supposed to be primitive. In this sense, I propose to include in the irreducible 
property of being primitive for a law the very fact that certain distributions of 
natural properties are privileged over others: otherwise, what does a natural law 
stand for, if not for dictating a certain nomological structure for (a portion of) 
the natural world? According to this proposal, taking laws to be primitive in the 
above sense might recall the Strawsonian sort of solution to the induction 
problem, according to which there cannot be any question as to the rationality of 
the employment of induction, since by being rational we mean, amongst other 
things, using induction. The primitive status of laws would be exactly what 
gives us the right to consider laws as governing entities, since imposing a 
structure over the whole set of possible distributions of natural properties is one 
of the features by which we conceive nomicity for the natural world8. In other 
words, nothing in the formulation of PGL prevents that, if we allow PGL itself 
its Strawsonian role, we might see it somehow negotiating with natural reality 
so as to incline toward certain arrangement of natural properties instead of 
others. 
                                                          
8 I said one of the features and not the feature, otherwise I would have turned back to the above 
mentioned claim according to which we should define laws in that way, a claim that – as I have 
recalled earlier – Humeans can consistently resist. 
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4 Nomic primitivism and the interpretation of the wave 
function in Bohmian mechanics 
 
In addition to its interest by a strictly philosophical viewpoint, the primitivism 
on laws of nature may have a significant connection with a recent option 
discussed in the area of the foundations of contemporary physics, and in 
particular within the issue of the status of the wave function (usually denoted by 
the Greek letter ψ) in quantum theory, in fact, one of the most controversial 
issues in that area (Albert, Ney 2013). As far as the usual meaning attached to 
the traditional ψ in standard quantum mechanics is concerned, a ‘wave function’ 
ψS is, according to textbook presentations, a formal tool that can be assigned to a 
single microsystem S and whose main role is to enable an observer to calculate 
the probability of obtaining one of the permissible outcomes in a well-defined 
experimental setting. There was a time in which some of the founding fathers of 
quantum theory – from Schrödinger to De Broglie, from the early Born to 
Einstein – entertained the idea that the wave function could be some sort of 
physical entity in its own right and not just a convenient computational tool. As 
a matter of fact, it soon became clear that the peculiar status of the mathematical 
space in which the wave function lives prevented this idea to hold in naïvely 
realistic terms and the wave function acquired rapidly the purely informational 
role that the orthodox formulation of quantum mechanics attributed to it for 
decades. In more recent years, however, the obsolescence of the Copenhagen 
orthodoxy and the flowering of interpretational analysis of quantum mechanics 
led to a growing dissatisfaction with a merely epistemic view of the wave 
function, so as to push the pendulum toward radical views in the opposite 
direction: the most notable example is the wave function ontology or configuration 
space realism (Albert 1996), according to which “the fundamental space in which 
entities evolve is not three-dimensional, but instead 3N-dimensional, where N is 
the total number of particles standardly thought to exist in the three-
dimensional universe” (Monton 2002, p. 265).  
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 In a particular formulation of quantum mechanics, namely Bohmian 
mechanics, an interpretation has been proposed according to which the wave 
function can be conceived as a nomological entity, namely an entity “more in the 
nature of a law than a concrete physical reality” (Goldstein, Zanghì 2013, p. 96). 
This interpretation proposes somehow a shift from the question of the nature of 
the wave function to the question of its role: namely the issue is not what kind of 
object the wave function is but rather what the wave function does for grounding 
the ontology in a nomological sense (Dürr, Goldstein, Zanghì 2013, Goldstein, 
Zanghì 2013)9. It is this nomological interpretation that naturally raises the 
question of how and to what extent this foundational debate concerning 
quantum theory may connect with the above considerations on the status of 
natural laws  In particular, two basic questions arise:  
1) How exactly should we understand the meaning of ‘nomological’?  
2) Under the hypothesis that such meaning can be made sufficiently clear, can 
such an entity as a ‘nomological’ one be really thought of as part of the physical 
world and in what sense?  
Standard Bohmian mechanics is an observer-free formulation of (non-
relativistic) quantum mechanics, according to which the latter describes quantum 
particles and their trajectories in physical space and time: in doing this, Bohmian 
mechanics is said to provide a space-time ontology of non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics, namely a class of well-specified kind of objects and properties 
displayed in space-time that quantum mechanics is supposed to be about: being 
the primary target of the theory, this space-time ontology is called primitive 
ontology 10. In this framework, the wave function plays a crucial role: in addition 
to satisfying the Schrödinger’s equation, the wave function determines the 
particles’ motion via the especially Bohmian addition to the ordinary structure of 
                                                          
9 It is in this sense that Bohmian mechanics might be interpreted as “en-theorizing” a form of 
nomological realism for the wave function, similarly to what several years ago Arthur Fine 
proposed in order to assess the very nature of the Einsteinian use of such notions as ‘realism’, 
‘causality’ and ‘determinism’ (Fine 1986). For some remarks on a more general en-theorizing 
strategy concerning BM, see Laudisa 2012. 
10 There is now an extended literature on the details of such an ontology and its connections with 
many of the general, interpretive issues in the foundations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, 
and this is not the place to provide a review. For a recent presentation and re-assessment, see 
Dürr, Goldstein, Zanghì 2013. 
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quantum mechanics, namely the so-called guiding equation. On the basis both of 
this central role of the wave function in its basic formulation and its generically 
‘realistic’ flavor – the theory is ‘observer-free’ to the extent to which all 
observation-related notions are derivative and not primary in the theory – a 
decisive question that deals with the very foundations of Bohmian mechanics is 
then how to make sense of the wave function, without incurring either into the 
Schylla of a purely instrumental view of it on one side or into the Charybdis of a 
heavy ‘object-like’ view of it on the other.  
 As far as the usual meaning attached to the traditional ψ in standard quantum 
mechanics is concerned, a ‘wave function’ ψS is, according to textbook 
presentations, a formal tool that can be assigned to a single microsystem S and 
whose main role is to enable an observer to calculate the probability of obtaining 
one of the permissible outcomes in a well-defined experimental setting.  If we 
start thinking differently about the ψS, however, as is the case with the Everett 
interpretation or the Bohmian mechanics, the only system S to which a ψS can be 
genuinely attached is the whole universe, a circumstance that yields deep 
implications. In Bohmian mechanics the wave function of the universe – let us 
denote it with Ψ – plays a crucial role at different levels. It is Ψ that the basic 
equations of the theory govern in a fundamental sense and when we discuss the 
status of the wave function as a nomological entity, it is Ψ that we are primarily 
talking about.  
Within this framework, conceiving the Ψ in nomological terms presents some 
remarkable advantages. First, the nomological interpretation allows one to 
justify the circumstance according to which the particles’ motion is affected by 
the wave function without affecting it back: when we think of a ‘law’ determining 
in some sense the phenomena falling under its application domain, we do not 
expect any reaction behavior by the law-governed phenomena on the law itself! 
Second, the nomological interpretation seems able to accommodate more 
naturally the celebrated problem of time in quantum cosmology. If the Ψ as a law 
is supposed to aptly govern the particles’ motion and the related properties, only 
the latter are supposed to change over time and not the wave function: if it is a 
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law that governs the way in which things in the world change, we expect the 
law-governed things to depend on time, not the law itself: “from a Bohmian 
perspective, the timelessness of Ψ is not a problem. Rather, it is just what the 
doctor ordered.” (Goldstein, Zanghì 2013, p. 100). Third, the nomological 
interpretation seems especially suitable for a further feature of Bohmian 
mechanics, namely the possibility to recover from Ψ the wave functions ψS′, 
ψS′′,…,  that can be assigned to well-defined subsystems S′, S′′, … of the 
universe in a suitable sense. This possibility obtains in Bohmian mechanics 
through the definition of the so-called conditional wave function: I argue that this 
definition, in addition to allowing a well-defined notion of a subsystem of the 
universe, is a further instance of what it might mean for the Ψ to be mainly a 
nomological entity. Let Ψt  be the wave function of the universe at time t and let 
S be a specific system under scrutiny (clearly, S is also a subsystem of the 
universe whose wave function is Ψ). Let us suppose further to decompose the 
configuration of the universe Q = (X, Y) into the configuration X of the system S 
and the configuration Y of the rest of the universe, something that we may call 
the ‘environment’ of S. Then we define the conditional wave function of S at time t 
by the expression 
ψt (x) =  Ψt (x, Y) 
A remarkable implication of this definition is that, under suitable conditions, the 
conditional wave function of S does indeed satisfy the Schrödinger’s equation for 
S, namely, given the wave function of the universe, each of the wave functions 
ψS′, ψS′′,… of the subsystems S′, S′′, … of the universe behaves just like ordinary 
quantum mechanics prescribes they should phenomenologically behave11. 
But in addition to the ‘conservation’ of the state phenomenology, which is an 
important property anyway, there is a further point that is directly relevant to 
our present philosophical discussion:  the joint action of the Ψ and the primitive 
ontology in fixing the state of the ordinary systems that we deal with. Suppose 
an observer O who is operating with a specific system S, on which she is about to 
                                                          
11 A rigorous justification that the conditional wave function is phenomenologically ‘well-
behaved’ can be found in Dürr, Goldstein, Zanghì 1992. 
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perform a measurement. By assuming a primitive ontology of actual 
configurations that are independent from preparation and measurement 
procedures, BM allows O to concentrate on S by putting to work the whole 
galaxy of the space-time locations of all the subsystems that are ontologically 
fixed anyway but that are not directly relevant to the measurement on S: in a 
sense, the whole ontological web of the (per se existing) space-time locations 
works as a fixed parameter, except for the x that figures as argument of the 
conditional wave function ψ
 
(x). But if we agree that the specification of states for 
subsystems of the universe is a fundamental nomological task of a theory with a 
wide scope such as quantum mechanics is usually assumed to have, the 
nomological role that the wave function takes on in BM is apparent here. The 
Ψ does not belong to the basic endowment of primitive ontology, but it is in its 
‘interplay’ with primitive ontology that it expresses its role of state 
determination: no direct entity-realism concerning the wave function is assumed, 
but rather a primitive-ontology-based theory in which a precise story is told on 
how the wave function – although not belonging itself sic et simpliciter to the 
inventory of primitive ontology – implements an observer-free description of 
quantum systems in terms of such primitive ontology.  
On the background of our preceding discussion on nomic primitivism, at least 
two general points are in order. First, the general view of laws as primitive 
entities may turn out to be well-suited to the role that the wave function as-a-
law occupies in Bohmian mechanics, since such role appears not reducible to 
anything more fundamental in the overall structure of the theory. Second, the 
specific nomic role that the wave function plays in Bohmian mechanics may 
exemplify the idea that a nomic entity like a wave function in Bohmian 
mechanics can be ‘part of’ an ontology without being necessarily conceived as an 
ordinary, stuff-like object. As we have seen, the wave function is not in itself a 
piece of primitive ontology, but it plays the role of generating and making 
possible the ‘displacement’ of primitive ontology and its features in space-time. 
The picture that emerges is, so to say, two-dimensional: the entities included in 
the primitive ontology belong to the dimension of what fundamentally exists in 
space-time, but the wave function belongs to the dimension of what tells 
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primitive ontology how to behave in space-time. Therefore, a sensible way to do 
justice in philosophical terms to this role of the wave function is to take the wave 
function itself as primitive, although in a nomic sense. 
 But what is this ‘two-dimensional’ talk I am referring to? Basically, it is a way 
to contemplate two different fashions in which something can be part of physical 
reality according to a Bohmian perspective: the first pertaining to the primitive 
ontology, the second to the wave function as-a-law. Unless we allow ourselves to 
distinguish at least these two different ways of being part of physical reality, we 
can hardly avoid the conclusion that the wave function, if it is to be something 
more than a computational tool, is real to the same extent as the entities of the 
primitive ontology, something that in Bohmian mechanics makes no sense. It 
might be correct to claim, as Esfeld et al. 2014 do, that if we ground the 
nomological interpretation of the wave function onto nomic primitivism “there is 
no sharp distinction between a nomological and an ontological interpretation of 
the wave function, since laws belong to the stock of physical reality as well” 
(Esfeld et al. 2014, p. 780). But no sharp distinction does not imply no distinction 
at all. We may think to have a sort of plane, spanned by two dimensions: that of 
the primitive ontology entities XPO and that of the nomological entities YN: each 
point in the XPO−YN plane represents an implementation of a possible behavior 
of PO in terms of a nomological entity (like the wave function). It is plausible to 
hold that what the theory is about is not just PO but PO plus the nomological 
entities in terms of which PO behaves, and nomological entities such as the wave 
function are essential in order for the behavior of PO to be described by the 
theory: as Esfeld et al. themselves say “we should be open-minded enough to 
concede that the ontology of a physical theory may contain other kinds of objects 
than just particles and fields” (Esfeld et al. 2014, p. 778)12. 
 
 
                                                          
12 In their recent paper, Esfeld, Lazarovici, Hubert and Dürr discuss two different options about 
the lawhood intuition that is supposed to ground the nomological interpretation of the wave 
function in Bohmian mechanics: “the Humean one that regards the law as a contingent regularity 
and the one that anchors the law in a disposition of motion of the particles” (Esfeld et al. 2013). In 
my opinion, neither is convincing and more persuasive than the primitivist option, but a detailed 
analysis and support for this claim are outside the scope of the present paper.  
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5 Conclusions 
 
On the 6th of April, 1922 Albert Einstein was invited to join at the Société 
Française de Philosophie. Asked of his opinion about the relation of his relativity 
theory with the epistemology of Ernst Mach – an epistemology which is 
remarkably similar to the regularist framework in important respects – Einstein 
replied: 
 
There does not appear to be a great relation from the logical point of view between the 
theory of relativity and Mach’s theory. For Mach, there are two points to distinguish: on 
one hand there are the immediate data of experience, things we cannot touch; on the 
other there are concepts which we can modify. Mach’s system studies the existing 
relations between data of experience; for Mach, science is the totality of these relations. 
That point of view is wrong and, in fact, what Mach has done is to make a catalogue, not a 
system. (Einstein 1923, p. 253, emphasis added) 
 
What in memory of the Einsteinian claim we can also call the catalogue view of 
laws proposed by the regularists turns out to be implausible for analogous 
reasons. This view is logically consistent but implausible in that it misses what 
makes a scientific theory of natural phenomena a system rather than a list. It is 
not true that to assume that there is an ordered structure for phenomena – that 
order being a consequence of the operations of laws – is a requirement defensible 
only in analogy with the use of the notion of law in other domains: it is simply 
that nature turns out to be incomprehensible without such a structure. 
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